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Conflict in the Shadow of Conflict 
By SE HOON BANG AND JAESOO KIM* 
We study how an advantage given to an interim winner in sequential 
conflicts characterizes dynamic competition between players and 
influences their payoffs. As the intensity of competition during each 
period is negatively correlated, perfect security is not necessarily 
desirable for contending parties. We present results which are widely 
applicable to various types of dynamic competition, where competition 
in each period is linked to the interim winner’s relative advantage. 
Policy implications are also discussed in a variety of areas, and 
several extensions are explored. 
Key Word: Sequential Conflicts, All-Pay Auctions,  
Sequential Innovations, Arms Race 
JEL Code: D44, D74, 031 
 
 
  I. Introduction 
 
e often observe that conflicts or competition among economic agents are not 
easily concluded. In particular, if a prize awarded after a contest is not 
instantly secured, the competing parties may have to endure a series of conflicts 
afterwards. For instance, even if a tribe assails another tribe and appropriates a 
valuable resource, the invaded tribe may not simply relinquish the resource but 
may attempt to retake it.1 Similarly, although a firm may succeed in developing a 
new innovation and earning a patent, rivals may be able to imitate the innovation 
unless the patent is ironclad. As a result, they expect that a patent holder will end 
up in litigation against potential imitators. Cumulative innovations are also a type 
of sequential conflict. Suppose that the development of commercial technology 
would not be possible without the findings of basic research. When identical firms 
compete for research first and for development second, weak protection for basic 
research would trigger competition for the second innovation.  
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1A large body of literature exists on conflict and appropriation, where property rights are not perfectly 
enforced and economic parties are contesting insecure properties. See the excellent survey paper by Garfinkel and 
Skaperdas (2006) on the detailed development of research in this field. 
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In these examples, the characteristics of the subsequent conflict are significantly 
different from those of the initial conflict. Once the winning party securely holds 
the prize, the successive contest is no longer a “fair” competition but rather a battle 
between protecting and stealing.2 In such a case, it is likely that the defensive party 
has is in an advantageous position than the offensive party in most cases. To 
capture this aspect, we incorporate a measure of the degree of defensibility or 
security against potential threats. This can be thought of as the strength of a patent 
against an imitation, or the degree of forward protection of a patent in an 
environment of cumulative innovations.  
More generally, this is the first winner’s relative advantage over her rival in the 
successive conflict, where she is favored in the next conflict given her higher 
winning probability. There are various types of dynamic competition in which the 
first winner has an advantage over a rival in subsequent contests. ICT industries, in 
which a large network effect prevails and/or switching costs exist, are good 
examples because an incumbent firm can enjoy a significant advantage in a 
subsequent contest. Moreover, considering sequential elections, a winner in an 
initial election often receives more media attention and financial support and will 
therefore  have more opportunities to win in the next election. In these examples 
of dynamic competition, one can see that not only an immediate reward but also a 
relative advantage enjoyed by an initial winner subsequently can determine 
players’ effort or investment levels during the entire contest. 
This paper initially studies how the advantage created in sequential conflicts 
characterizes the dynamic competition between players and influences their 
payoffs. We develop a two- period model of dynamic competition which is based 
on the literature of conflict economics, where players are involved in a battle in 
which the prize is not secured immediately. We then show that the results are 
generally applicable to dynamic competition, in which the competition at each 
stage is linked to the interim winner’s relative advantage in various aspects. 
We start by demonstrating that the intensity levels of competition in the first 
period and in the second period are negatively correlated. If the property is 
perfectly defensible, agents fight only once in the first period. Not surprisingly, as 
the possibility of a second battle arises, agents play less aggressively in the first 
battle. In other words, as the property becomes less defensible, the intensity of 
competition is transmitted from the first period to the second. If it becomes 
perfectly non-defensible, they would fight only once, but in the second period. 
Here, an interesting question is how the overall equilibrium competition, or more 
precisely the overall investment made by players, is characterized by the degree of 
defensibility. Although many types of dynamic competition have been studied, 
analyzing the overall competition over the long term from such a perspective has 
rarely been done. However, its importance cannot be disregarded, especially if one 
can manage dynamic competition to maximize contestants’ total efforts over the 
periods in question. 
First, we first show non-monotonic relationships between the overall equilibrium 
 
2Grossman and Kim (1995) make a distinction between offensive weapons and defensive fortifications. Their 
main focus was to show how the full security of claims to property can be achieved. In contrast, we attempt to 
explain how imperfect security influences intertemporal competition during sequential conflicts. 
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investments and the degree of defensibility. In doing this, there are two different 
cases. If marginal competition decreases in the magnitude of the prize, the 
equilibrium level of the investments overall takes on an inverse U-shape with 
regard to the degree of defensibility, with a unique maximum at a particular degree 
of insecurity. In contrast, if marginal competition increases, the equilibrium level of 
overall investments is then pseudo U-shaped with a unique minimum. 
The result in the former case implies that the overall intensity of competition 
becomes stronger if the interim winner has a relative advantage in dynamic 
competition. More importantly, from the perspective of a competition planner, it 
becomes possible to maximize the expected effort levels by selecting the optimal 
relative advantage or disadvantage of the first winner; i.e., it becomes possible to 
award a favor, or impose disfavor, on the first winner during the second period, 
depending on the nature of the competition. When the first winner rarely has an 
advantage in subsequent contests, giving him a favor boosts dynamic competition. 
In contrast, when the first winner has too much of an advantage in successive 
contests, removing some advantages can increase players’ effort levels in an 
environment of dynamic competition. For example, in repeated procurements, an 
incumbent firm which won in the first period may have cost advantages by learning 
by doing or transferable investments in the second period. In such a case, an 
auctioneer prefers to remove the incumbent’s advantages by requiring the winner to 
share information or the outcome of investments with rivals. 
We also extend the model in several ways to show the robustness of our results 
and explore several other interesting implications. First, the basic result will hold 
when the interim winner has an advantage in payoffs. Second, we analyze n-period 
contests after which we investigate how uncertainty regarding the degree of 
security affects the intensity of competition in both periods. Last, we relax the 
assumption of winner-take-all competition. We believe that all of these extensions 
yield worthwhile results. 
In the literature on optimal contests or all-pay auctions, there are a number    
of papers on how a contest designer can increase the overall level of investments   
of contestants in sequential contests. Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1993) showed 
that is occasionally better for the seller to exclude some buyers in order to  
increase her expected revenue. Clark and Riis (1998) explored whether to distribute 
prizes sequentially or simultaneously. Gradstein and Konrad (1999) compared 
simultaneous contests and a series of pairwise contests. Moldovanu and Sela 
(2001) studied how prizes should be allocated and whether there should be one 
prize or more than two prizes depending on the shapes of cost functions.3 However, 
our paper addresses this issue from the perspective of a designer who attempts to 
control a relative (dis)advantage of a previous winner so as to elicit maximum 
efforts from contest participants.4 We also examine how this capability of a 
 
3Many recent papers study optimal prize allocation rules in dynamic contests using experiments, including 
Cason et al. (2010) and Sheremeta (2010) among others. See Dechenaux (2015) for a more detailed survey in this 
area. 
4Meyer (1991, 1992), in a dynamic setting, drew conclusions similar to ours when arguing that an optimal 
contract should have a positive bias. With the more general setting provided here, however, it should be negatively 
biased when the first winner has a sufficiently large advantage. Similarly, several implications of the findings by 
Laffont and Tirole (1988) are similar to those here, as they show that an incumbent with transferable investments 
should be favored at the reprocurement stage. 
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designer is related to the various tactics available to him, including the division of 
rewards, extending the contest periods, and imposing different degrees of 
uncertainty on the security of the prize. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we explain the conflict 
technology and the setup of a basic model. We characterize equilibrium and 
analyze the results and then discuss applications of the model and its policy 
implications in Sections III and IV. In Section V, we extend the model in several 
ways to show the robustness of the results and investigate additional interesting 
findings. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
II. Basic Model 
 
Consider the following two-period model. There are two risk-neutral agents. 
Agent 1 and 2 contest an exogenous prize, R. This prize can be thought of as a 
newly found diamond mine, an increase in profits from developing a new 
technology, or a license for a new business. First, they choose the weapons level 
and fight against each other for the prize. The battle is a winner-take-all contest. 
Given that ig  and jg  represent the quantity of the arms,  ,  i jp g g  denotes 
the probability that agent i becomes the winner to claim the entire resource. We 
employ the following function form for the technology of conflict.5 
 
(1)   ( )(,  ) ( )ii ii j
f g
f g
p g
f
g
g
   
 
 f x  is a non-negative and increasing; i.e.,  / 0.f x   We also assume 
     2  f x f x f x   to satisfy second-order conditions.6 The symmetry in this 
conflict technology ensures fair competition. The result of the contest determines 
the interim winner and loser in the first period.7 
Second, the loser has an opportunity to appropriate the prize from the winner. 
This consecutive contest is a battle between offense and defense. We continue to 
assume here that the battle is the winner-take-all contest such that the final winning 
agent can have perfect security about her prize. In this sense, payoffs from 
consuming the prize are realized at the end of the second period.8 At this point, we 
 
5This class of conflict technology has been employed in several studies, as is well summarized in Dixit (1987) 
and in Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2006). They also explain some of the main characteristics of this technology and 
compare it to other functional forms. 
6This model satisfies a sufficient condition for the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium; the proof can be 
found in Skaperdas (1992). 
7Indeed, our model is not directly applicable to R&D races, because innovation always takes place in the 
model of contest. However, we believe that our basic ideas and intuitions are applicable in various types of 
dynamic competition. 
8Another way to understand this model is by considering that symmetric agents compete for the prize R1 in 
the first period, and depending on the outcome of the first period, the favorable winner and unfavorable loser 
compete for R2 in the second period. Our basic model is merely normalizing R1 = 0. In fact, including interim 
payoffs does not change our basic results. In this sense, our model and results are relevant to explain other types of 
dynamic competition, even if they are not involved in contests with insecure prizes. 
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make the distinction between offense and defense such that defending the prize 
may be more effective than predating it given the same level of arms, or vice versa. 
We adjust the conflict technology in the following manner, 
 
(2) ( ) ( )( , ) and 1 ( , )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
f w f lq w l q w l
f w f l f w f l

       
 
where  ,  q w l  is the probability that the interim winner can keep the prize when 
w and l are respectively the winner’s defensive weapons and the loser’s offensive 
weapons. Likewise,  1 ,  q w l  is the probability that the loser can appropriate in 
the second battle. Note that   is a parameter that indicates the effectiveness of  
the offensive weapons against the defensive weapons. If   is smaller (greater) 
than 1, offense is less (more) effective than defense. Therefore,   is a measure of 
the security of its claim to property once one agent owns the property after the 
contest of the first period.   = 0 indicates a perfect property right. As   
increases, the property right becomes less strong. We will often refer to the inverse 
of   as the degree of defensibility or security in the paper. Another interpretation 
of the degree of security is the relative advantage that the interim winner has over 
her rival in the successive battle. For simplicity, we assume that there is no 
discount and that the war is not destructive. 
 
III. The Equilibrium Analysis 
 
As usual, our analysis starts from the second period following backward 
induction. Once again, both battles are assumed to be winner-take-all contests. 
Regardless of who wins in the  first period, the winner in the second period has 
fully secure property rights to the prize. Thus, the interim winner and loser payoff 
functions are given by 
 
   ,  1  ,   .W LV q w l R w and V q w l R l       
 
Each agent chooses the number of arms given its rival’s choice. We obtain      
the following first-order conditions: 
( , )
1 0 and  qW l
W W l
w lV VR
      
( , )
1 0.q
l
w l
R
    Using (2), the first-order conditions are summarized as 
follows: 
 
2 2[ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )] .
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
f w f l f w f l R
f w f l f l f w
 
 
     
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According to these conditions, the winner and loser choose a symmetrical number 
of weapons for equilibrium regardless of .  The symmetrical values of 
*  ( ),w R  and *  ( ),l R  must satisfy 
 
(3) 
* *
* * 2
( ) ( )
( ) ) ( )1(
f w f l R
f w f l

     
 
The given assumption of  f x  ensures that   
f x
f x  is non-decreasing. It can 
be easily shown that *  ( ),w R  and *  ( ),l R  are decreasing when 1   and 
increasing when 1.   In other words, they invest in arms most when they are 
involved in fair competition, i.e., 1.   The equilibrium probabilities and 
payoffs are as follows: 
 
* * *
1 1( , ) and 1 ( , ) ;
(1 ) (1 )
( , ) and ( , ).
1 1W L
q w l q w l
R RV w R V l R
 
  
   

   
    
 
 
First, it is important to note that * *1 .
1W L
V R V
       If 1,   the winner’s 
payoff is greater than the loser’s payoff. In addition, it is expected that agents 
prefer to be the winner in the first battle. If 1,   in contrast, the loser’s payoff is 
greater. Agents are expected to prefer to be the loser in the first battle. That is to 
say, in the first battle, agents are willing to lose and therefore do not fight. In such a 
case, they wait and fight only once in the second period. Thus, hereafter, it is 
assumed that 1   for the rest of the discussion. It would be rather sensible to 
assume that the winner favors protecting his prize against the loser’s attempt to 
steal it. 
Given the second period outcome above, at this point we solve the following 
first-period problem. Each agent maximizes 
 
* *( ) [1 ( , , ,)]i i j W i j L iV p g g V p g g V g    
 
where each agent obtains the winner’s payoff with probability  ,  i jp g g  and the 
loser’s payoff with probability  1 ,  .i jp g g  The first-order condition is 
 * *( , ) 1 0.i ji W L
i i
p g gV V V
g g
       The incentive for investments in arms depends 
crucially on the difference between the winner’s payoff and the loser’s payoff. The 
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symmetrical equilibrium investments in arms, * * *i jg g g   satisfy 
 
(4) 
* *
*
*
1 , if 1,( )
4 1 4
( )
0, if 1.
W LV V Rf g
f g
 

           
 
 
One can immediately note that *  ( ),g R  is decreasing in ,  contrary to the 
effect of   on    * *,  or ,  .w R l R   As the prize is more defensible in the 
future, agents fight more aggressively in the first battle. From (3) and (4) together, 
we find a well-known implication in the literature which holds that the levels of 
intensity of competition during the first and second battles are negatively 
correlated.
9 
 
Lemma 1 
* * *
0( , ) ( , ) ( , ) 0.g R w R l R    
      and As the property becomes less  
defensible, the first battle becomes less aggressive and  the second  battle becomes more aggressive.
 
Let us analyze how the degree of defensibility influences the agents’     
overall equilibrium investments in arms, which is      * ** , ,, + ,
2
w R l R
g R
     
 
 
FIGURE 1 
 
 
9This intuitive outcome is comparable to the literature on switching costs and customer poaching competition. 
When there are switching costs, a group of customers served by a firm in the first period is almost perfectly 
defensible as its source of profits in the second period. Firms in industries with switching costs compete very 
aggressively in the initial period, after which then they can attain a collusive outcome. See Klemperer (1987a). 
However, the literature on customer poaching explains the opposite situation. Roughly speaking, when competing 
firms expect aggressive customer poaching competition in the second period, they compete less aggressively in the 
first period. See Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) and Chen (1997). 
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i.e.,    * * ., ,g R w R   We show below that this function is concave and has a 
maximum of  0,1 .    
 
Lemma 2 
 
   
 
 * 0,1 .
f x f x
f x f x
  If Ifis  convex  or  linear, there exists a unique maximum  
 ** 0,1 . concave, there exists a unique minimum   
 
The total investments in arms show a non-monotonic relationship in ,  and 
depend on how the marginal competition changes. If the marginal competition    
is nonincreasing with regard to the size of the prize, i.e., 
2
2
( ) 0,
( )
f x
f xx
     
 the 
overall competition is increasing as *    and decreasing as * .  10 The 
intuition for this result is as follows. For a relatively large degree of defensibility, 
the effect of a unit increase in investment in the first period is minimal on one’s 
winning probability or payoff, because competition in the first battle is nearly 
saturated. The marginal return of investment is greater in the second battle. This is 
why competition in the second period is marginally more aggressive than in the 
first. A similar explanation is possible for a relatively small degree of defensibility. 
In contrast, if the marginal competition is increasing regarding the size of the prize, 
i.e., 
2
2
( ) 0,
( )
f x
f xx
     
 this result dramatically changes in that the overall 
competition is now decreasing as **    and increasing as ** .   
In equilibrium, the two agents have an equal probability to receive the prize R, 
and they spend      * ** , ,
2
,
w R l R
g R
    to buy arms. The symmetric 
equilibrium payoff of each agent is as follows: 

* * * *
* *
*
( , ) ( , )( , ) ( , ) , if  1,
2 2 2
( , )
, if  1.
4
W LV V R w R l Rg R g R
V R
R
   


            

 
 
10 ( )
( )
f x
f x
 is convex or linear in various types of functions. such as ( ) ln  and ( ) af x x f x x  for
0 1.    
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Example 1    .f x x WeFor  a simple example, we assume for  the technology of  conflict   
* * * *
2: ,(1 ) i j
w l R g g g    can easily  characterize the  equilibrium as follows
 
 
2
* * * *
2
1 3 1, . 1 / 3.
1 4 4 1
i j
R RV V V   
         and In this example, Thus, at equilibrium,
 Payoffs are decreasing if < 1 / 3 and  increasing if > 1 / 3.   
 
 
IV. Policy Implications and Applications 

One of the main contributions of this paper is that it shows how the theoretic 
model and analysis of sequential conflicts presented in the previous section can be 
applied to a number of social and economic environments, from more direct types 
such as international arms races to quite subtle types such as R&D races among 
firms, the designs of procurement auctions, and even educational systems and 
structures, thereby providing valuable implications pertaining to many types of 
diplomatic, economic, and educational policies involved therein. 
Note that the results summarized above tell us that the advantage created in 
sequential conflicts characterizes dynamic competition between players and 
influences the players’ payoffs, where the prize the interim winner has obtained is 
not secure immediately but only has some advantages in later stages of the 
competition. 
The finding that the overall competition or investment levels made by players 
are crucially affected by the degree of defensibility as well as the direction of 
changes in the marginal competition regarding the size of the interim prize has 
important implications on the optimal level of the interim winner’s advantage. 
Whenever such a direction is positive, a contest planner would have to eliminate 
subsequent competitions which possibly arise thereafter by fortifying the security 
of the rewards given to an interim winner, if she wants to maximize the overall 
effort levels of the competing parties. If the direction is the other way around, the 
planner’s strategy should be reversed as well. 
The paper introduces a simple but robust result from a contest model, which has 
only been applied to very restricted areas such as military-relatedness issues. 
Nonetheless, the results indeed shed light on more extensive economic and social 
problems, including those shown hereafter. Firstly, there are many economic 
environments in which these results can have considerable implications. Provided 
that firms’ R&D investment and innovation incentives are regarded as the most 
important factors for bringing economic development in a number of major 
technology-intensive industries, from information technology to the biotechnology 
industries, the optimal length and strength of patent protection to enhance 
innovation incentives among firms have always been a substantial issue. Similarly, 
with reference to repeated procurements, the optimal advantages given to 
incumbent firms and the level of information disclosure/sharing are also critical 
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issues. 
Applying the implications of the results is as straightforward as it is useful. For 
instance, when considering an optimal educational policy as to the college 
admission process or any similar selection process of which the ultimate goal is to 
maximize students’ effort levels during their pre-college years, the direction of 
changes in the marginal competition among students may be one of the factors at 
which the policymakers should closely examine.11 This paper unfortunately does 
not show how such information can be acquired, as it is rather an empirical 
problem to do so. Nevertheless, it does indicate which aspect of students’ behaviors 
should be taken into account and how they can be interpreted and used successfully 
to achieve policy goals. 
Lastly, we provide various types of dynamic competition in which competition 
in each period is related according to the interim winner’s advantage, and discuss 
the applicability of the results shown above. Unless specified, our discussions are 
based on the case where 
 
 
f x
f x  is convex. 
  
• Insecure Prizes. Nations and tribes in warfare buy more arms when winner’s 
prize is not perfectly secure. When a sequence of innovations is undertaken 
by both firms, the firms invest more when the patent for the first innovation 
is not perfectly strong. 
• Repeated demands for bribes. When a corrupt government official sells a license 
which is necessary to open a shop, he commonly demands more than once, 
threatening with the possibility of the replacement of the license owner.12 
Bribers can anticipate his repeated demands. In such a case, the possibility 
of a threat in the future is reducing   from 0 in our model. This aspect can 
then increase the official’s revenue. This result is in sharp contrast to that of 
Choi and Thum (2003), who studied the dynamics of corruption. In their 
model, both the dynamic consistency problem and intertemporal price 
discrimination undermine a corrupt official’s revenues. The crucial 
difference in our model is incorporating competition between bribers. 
• Internal competition at companies. Meyer (1992) studied biased contests for an 
organization’s promotion decisions. The officer provides employees having 
shown high performance with more productive tasks, better work 
environments, or more opportunities for education and training.13 This result 
is consistent with choosing the optimal *  in our model. However, while 
that model can show that a positive bias for the first winner minimizes the 
 
11Once this factor is specified and clarified, it would greatly help policymakers to reach proper decisions 
about, for example, whether to allow a college to discriminatorily evaluate applicants according to the 
performance and reputation of the high school from which they are graduating, as this policy and regulation is 
closely related to the “interim winner’s advantage.” 
12Choi and Thum (2004) introduce several examples or repeated extortion in bribes, organized crime, and 
expropriations of multinational corporations. 
13“For example, at 3M, divisions and even groups purposefully compete with one another. At Bloomingdale’s, 
the merchandising vice president, buyers, and fashion coordinators engage in an unending tussle for scarce floor 
space. The company reorganizes regularly as both winners and losers emerge.” — Peters and Waterman (1988) 
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principal costs, our model represents the uniqueness and magnitude of 
optimal bias. 
• Learning by doing during repeated procurement. This issue was studied by Lewis 
and Yildirim (2002), especially with the example of the repeated purchases 
of weapon systems, aircraft, and missiles by the Department of Defense. Our 
model suggests that the principal can prefer handicapping the first winner, 
who is now more efficient at the reprocurement stage, by information 
sharing. 
• Property rights and R&D incentives. Reinforcing property rights is not 
necessarily desirable for the winner. When *  ,   her equilibrium payoff 
decreases as the degree of defensibility rises, i.e., as   falls. If this is the 
case, interestingly, contending agents prefer to remain in an insecure 
situation. The result is reminiscent of Gallini (1992) and Choi (1998) in the 
imitation literature. They have shown that a longer patent lifetime or a 
stronger patent does not necessarily increase an innovator’s payoff. They 
came to this result after correspondingly incorporating costly imitation and 
strategic information transmission through patent litigation. We come to the 
same conclusion when allowing for repeated innovation by the same firm. 
Another slight difference is that they investigated ex-post innovator’s 
incentives while this paper studies agents’ ex ante incentives prior to 
competition. 
• Dynamic competition with switching costs. The literature on switching costs is 
comparable to the second case in which marginal competition increases. 
Klemperer (1987a) basically showed the equivalence of the two extreme 
cases of   = 0 and   = 1. When switching costs exist, the second period 
competition nearly vanishes in that competing firms are able to achieve a 
collusive outcome. However, price wars in the first period compete away all 
of the expected rents in the second period. However, Klemperer (1987b) 
demonstrated how overall competition could be weakened when there is a 
group of new consumers in the second period. The portion of new 
consumers corresponds to   in our model. They are not defensible for the 
successive competition as a source of the firms’ profits, whereas old 
consumers whose preferences are constant are locked in. One can find that 
price competition in his model marginally increases, which is the driving 
force for the result.14 
 
 
14Indeed, the model by Klemperer (1987b) is more elaborate than our simple description above. It has another 
group of old consumers whose preferences in the second period are independent of their first period tastes. More 
importantly, consumers’ expectations about future prices are crucial to the results. In fact, his focus was on 
showing that competition in both periods could be relaxed when consumers have rational expectations. 
Nonetheless, it is true that overall competition is mitigated when consumers are myopic. 
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V. Extensions and Discussions 

In this section we extend the model several ways to realize further implications 
about sequential conflicts. In each extension, to isolate the implication of each 
case, we retain the others. 
 
A. Payoff Advantage 
 
Thus far, we assume a relative advantage for the interim winner by way of a 
more effective defense against offense in conflict technology. Here, we study 
another way by which the interim winner is favored to gain the final payoff. The 
second competition is now assumed to be fair in that      .,  ( )
f w
f
q w l
f w l   
However, the final winner receives (1 )R securely, while only R is 
contestable. The repeated winner is able to obtain an additional gain by (1 )R
when she finally wins in the successive contest. Alternatively, this situation can be 
interpreted as meaning that the loser may be able to appropriate only a portion of 
the prize. Thus, the inverse of   continues to represent defensibility. The interim 
winner and loser’s payoff functions are given by 
 
( ) (1 ) and V .
( ) ( )W L
f w lV R R w R l
f w f l w l
             
 
From the first-order condition and (1 ) ,W LV V R    it is straightforward to 
obtain 
**
* *
( )( ) 1 .
4( ) ( )
ji
i j
f gf g R
f g f g
    Again, only the second battle arises when 
 1,   whereas only the first battle occurs when  1.   At this point, the expected 
overall competition is characterized by the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1 ( ) ( )(1) (2)
(
[0,1]
)
.
( )
f x f x
f x f x
 If Ifis convex, there exists a unique maximum
*
* ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( )
( )
0. (3)  
2
f x
f
w R l Rg R
x
 
        
Ifis linear, is concave, there exists    
 ** 0,1 . a unique minimum   
 
A contest designer can increase contestants’ total effort levels by (dis)favoring 
the first winner during the payoff. Hence, our basic results are robust given this 
type of advantage. Moreover, this extension provides unique implications about 
how to allocate the prize in sequential contests. In fact, the setup can be viewed as 
the contest designer’s decision to distribute a single prize by the proportion of 
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1   and   in sequential contests. In other words, one can see that  1 R  
and R  are merely the payoffs in the first stage and second stage, respectively. In 
this case, when the marginal competition decreases, a sequential distribution can 
raise contestants’ efforts levels. 
This result is worthy of comparison to Clark and Riis (1998), who studied 
whether to distribute multiple prizes simultaneously or sequentially, and 
Moldovanu and Sela (2001), who compared the expected sum of efforts by a single 
prize and by more than two prizes. One important assumption in both papers was 
that contestants have different abilities. In our model, however, we show that the 
contest designer can increase the effort level through sequential competition 
between equally capable contestants. 
  
B. n-period Model 
 
One natural question is how the outcome would be if we extend the model to n-
period contests. When players engage in more battles, do they fight more 
vigorously? Does a principal want to make sequential contests longer? We answer 
all of these questions. For analytical simplicity and tractability, we follow the 
example above for the remainder of the paper. 
Suppose that two competing agents fight against each other n times to win a 
prize. The first battle is a fair competition, whereas the successive battles involve 
protecting and stealing. We solve this game by backward induction. The last n-th 
period game is no more than one in a two-period game. The winner and loser in the 
 1k  -th period maximizes the following payoff functions, respectively, where 
3 .k n  15 
 
(5) 
* *
1, 1 1 , 1 1 , 1
* *
1, 1 1 , 1 1 , 1
( , ) (1 ( , ))
and
(1 ( , )) ( , )
K W k k K W k k K L k
K L k k K W k k K L k
V q w l V q w l V w
V q w l V q w l V l
     
     
   
   
  
 
Again, the incentive for investments in arms depends on the difference between 
the winner’s payoff and the loser’s payoff in the next period. Thus, the number of 
arms to ensure equilibrium in the  1k  -th period is represented as follows: 
 
* * * *
1 1 , ,2(1 )k k k w k L
w l V V        
 
Putting this into the payoff functions in (5), we can derive the relationship between 
the equilibrium payoffs of the  1k  - th and the k-th periods. 
 
15We assume for n-period extension that either   or n is not sufficiently large. This guarantees positive 
payoffs at equilibrium. This is a trivial issue because this assumption can be avoided easily with including interim 
payoffs. 
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(6) * * * *1, 1, , ,
1
1K W K L K W K L
V V V V 
        
 
This implies that * * * *-1, -1, , ,    .k W k L k W k LV V V V          As a result, the 
equilibrium level of investments in arms is greater in the successive battle. That is 
to say, * * * *-1 -1  .k k k kw l w l    The following proposition summarizes the effects of 
long periods of battle on the overall competition over n periods and agents’ ex ante 
equilibrium payoffs. 
 
 
Proposition 2 :The overall  equilibrium investment in arms is as follows   
 
 
2* *
*
22
1 1 2 1 , 2.
2 2 1 4 1 1
n
n k k
i
k
w lg R R n        


                              
 
 
As n increases, the overall  equilibrium investment in arms rises and  agents' payoffs fall.   
 
One implication of this result is that the principal can increase players’ effort 
levels by extending the contest periods. Of course, some costs may be incurred 
when extending the contest periods. For example, internal competition which is too 
aggressive hampers cooperative work among workers. Thus, the principal may 
want to choose the optimal number of periods. 
 
C. Uncertainty of Defensibility 
 
The degree of security or defensibility,  , has been assumed to be certain thus 
far. Here, we are going to assume it away and study how uncertainty of   
influences agents’ arms races and payoffs. Here,   is a random variable that may 
follow either 1( )H   or 2 ( )H  . 2H  entails a riskier second period battle than 
1( )H   in the sense that 2 ( )H  is the mean preserving spread (MPS) of 1( ).H  16 
At this stage, we must solve the maximization problem of expected payoffs for 
each agent in each period. Risk neutrality allows the expected payoff to be 
additively separable. Given the functional form, it is straightforward to obtain the 
following result. 
 
 
16That is, for 0,1      and 1 10 0 0 01 2 1 2( ) ( ) , ( ) ( ) .h d h d H x dx H x dx             
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(7) 
 
 
* *
2
* * *
2
* * *
2
( ) ( ) ,
1
1( ) ( ) ( ) ,
4 1
3 1( ) ( ) ( ) .
4 1
i j
i j
E w E l E R
RE g E g E g E
RE V E V E V E






      
      
       
 
 
Proposition 3 As a situation becomes more risky, the more aggressive the first period  battle  
 is, and  the less aggressive the second  period  battle becomes, which is also true for  the overall    
.competition  
 
The effect of the MPS depends on the concavity or convexity of each of the 
functions. Given that the values of * *w l  are concave in ,  the MPS decreases 
with regard to its expectation. In contrast, *g  and *V  are convex and their 
expectation levels increase due to the transformation of the MPS. The intuition 
behind this result is simple. A more risky battle makes it more important to have a 
winner’s advantage in the second period. Thus, competing agents compete more 
aggressively in the first battle. In turn, this aggressive competition reduces the 
intensity of the competition in the second period. In addition, the second period 
competition dominates the first period competition by * * *.w l g   As a result, 
agents are better off when they are involved in a more risky battle. 
 
D. Relaxing the Winner-Take-All Principle 
 
We have assumed that contests are winner-take-all competitions. This 
assumption appears to be rather strong and inappropriate in the context of 
sequential innovation or imitation. However, relaxing this assumption does not 
change our basic results. In contrast, we find that contending parties compete more 
aggressively. The intuition here is simple as well. Unless the battle is a winner-
take-all competition, they share the prize according to the proportion of  1 2,  p g g  
and  1 21 ,  p g g  after the first battle. In the second battle, they have to protect 
their own property and attempt to appropriate the rival’s property at the same time. 
Put differently, they compete on two fronts. This makes the first battle more 
aggressive, making use of relative advantage more on one’s front and reducing 
losses from the relative disadvantage on one’s rival’s front. 
 
Proposition 4 The first battle becomes more aggressive if  the conflict is not a winner - take - all  contest.  
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VI. Concluding Remarks 
 
We have developed a simple dynamic model of sequential conflicts. The basic 
premise of the paper is that contending parties expect ensuing conflicts because 
properties are not perfectly secure even after engaging in a contest once. We have 
demonstrated how the degree of insecurity characterizes the dynamic competition 
in successive contests. We then explored how the contest designer wants to control 
the relative (dis)advantage of the initial winner in order to maximize all players’ 
overall effort levels, and how the results are related to the several techniques that 
the contest designer can employ, such as the dividing the prizes, extending the 
periods of contest, and imposing uncertainty on the security of the prize. 
A deficiency of the paper is that it does not analyze social welfare, especially in 
the context of sequential innovation, because innovation always takes place in our 
model. For instance, Denicola (2000) studied the socially optimal level of patent 
protection in an environment of sequential innovation, comparing four different 
regimes according to whether the second innovation is patentable and infringing. 
The focus of that paper was to investigate how the patent breadth should be chosen 
from the perspective of social welfare.17 In contrast, the present study focuses on 
characterizing dynamic competition and its implications, being based on more 
general settings in which various types of sequential conflicts can be analyzed. 
 
 
APPENDIX 
 
The Proof  of  Lemma 2.   
Applying the implicit differentiation to (3) and (4),    * *, , 0g R w R 
      
can be rearranged as follows: 
 
*
*
( )
( )
F w
F g

 ⪋
2(1 ) .
(1 )



  
 
Here,     = .
f x
F x
f x  Note that the inequality above holds when 0   while the 
inequality below holds when 1.   Because the right-hand side is decreasing in 
,  as long as the left-hand side is non-decreasing in *,     exists and is unique. 
One can show that the derivative of 
*
*
( )
( )
F w
F g
  
  
 with respect to   is non-negative 
when ( ) 0.F x   The other case can be proven similarly. 
 
17Green and Scotchmer (1995) argued that the first patent should be very broad to provide the first innovator 
with sufficient incentives to invest when different firms undertake a sequence of innovations. However, both this 
paper and that by Denicola (2000) consider cases in which the same firms compete for repeated innovations. 
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The Proof  of  Proposition 1.   
The proof here is very similar to that of Lemma 2. 
     * ** ,
2
0
,
,
w R l R
g R
 
      
  can be written as 
*
*
( )
( )
1.F g
F w

   Using 
       * * * *1,    0,    0  0,    1,    ,g R w R and g R w R      it is straightforward to 
show the existence of *.  The concave   F x  ensures that   
*
*
F g
F w

  is 
decreasing. 
 
 
The Proof  of  Proposition 2.   
* *
*
2
* * * * * *
2, 2, 3, 3, , ,2 2 2
2
1
4 (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
n
k k
i
k
W L W L n W n L
w lg
V V V V V V R    


                     

  
Because * * * *, , , ,
1
1
n k
k W k L n W n LV V V V


             by (6), solving the geometric 
sequence gives us 
 
2
* *1 * *
, ,
2
2
* *
, ,
11
1
12 1
1
1 11 .
2 1
n
n
k k
n w n L
k
n
n w n L
w l V V
V V




 
 




             
             

 
 
In addition, * * *2, 2,
1
4i W L
g V V     can be rewritten by 
2
* *
, ,
1 1 .
4 1
n
n W n LV V


          
Thus, we have  
 
2* *
* * *
, , 2
2
1 1 2 .
2 2 1 4 1
nn
k k
i n w n L
k
w lg V V R      


                         
   
Finally, we substitute * *, ,n w n LV V    by 
1 .
1
R
      
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The Proof  of  Proposition 3.   
Consider any function ( )   which is either convex or concave. Via integration by 
parts twice, we obtain 
 
 
 
1 2 1 2
2 1
1
2 1
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( ))
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
H HE v E v v d H H
H H v d
H H v d

    
   
   





  
 
  


 
 
 
Thus, the sign depends crucially on ).(     E      is greater (smaller) in 
 1H x  if ( )   is concave (convex). 
 
 
The Proof  of  Proposition 4.   
After the first battle, agents 1 and 2 hold  1 2,  p g g R  and   1 21  ,  ,p g g R  
respectively. Hence, each agent engages in offense and defense in the second battle. 
Following the first-order condition (3), each agent’s choice of investment about the 
property of agent 1 is  
* *
1 22 ( , )1
w l P g g R    and that of the property of 
agent 2 is    
* *
1 22 1 ( , ) .1
w l P g g R    The sum of the two is  2 ,1 R


which is identical to a winner-take-all competition. Each agent’s equilibrium payoff 
in the second battle can be written by follows: 
 
  
  
2
2,1 1 2 1 22
2
2,2 1 2 1 22
1 ( , ) 1 , and
1(1 )
1 1 , ( , ) .
1(1 )
V p g g R p g g R
V p g g R p g g R




      
       
 
 
In the first battle, agent 1 maximizes 1 2 2,1 1( , )p g g V g  and agent 2 maximizes 
  1 2 2,2 21 ,  p g g V g   at the same time. The symmetric outcome is 
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* * *
1 2 2 .4(1 )
Rg g g      This is greater than (4) in a winner-take-all competition. 
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